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NOTES
DUNHAM V. ANDERSON-DUNHAM, INC.:
DURESS BY CIRCUMSTANCE
Formation of a contract under the Louisiana Civil Code requires
"consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance,"' and
that this consent result from the "free and deliberate exercise of the
will" of both parties. 2 The code recognizes instances when the will of
a party may be impaired to such a degree that the consent to the
contract is "vitiated," thus allowing the party whose will is impaired
to have the contract rescinded.3 One such instance occurs when consent
is obtained through "duress," as characterized by the revision of 1984,
or by "violence or threats," as the code of 1870 provided. 4 Consistent
with the elements of the other "vices of consent," a claim of duress
will only support rescission if the party seeking annulment can prove
that he was free from fault when he entered into the contract.' Thus,
the duress must be "of such a nature as to cause a reasonable fear of
unjust and considerable injury to a party's person, property, or repu-
tation."' 6 This requirement promotes the security of transactions by
limiting the availability of the remedy of rescission to only those parties
deserving protection.'
In Dunham v. Anderson-Dunham, Inc.,' the First Circuit Court of
Appeal found that a party's consent to a contract had been vitiated by
the "duress of the circumstances," and that rescission was therefore
appropriate. This decision merits review for two reasons. First, while
the party whose consent the court found to be vitiated was clearly
indecisive about signing the contract, there does not appear to have
been the degree of impairment of his free will that the code and
jurisprudence require to support a finding of duress. Second, by basing
its finding of duress upon the circumstances surrounding the signing of
Copyright 1986, by LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. Civ. Code art. 1927.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 1819 (1870); see also La. Civ. Code art. 1948 and comments.
3. La. Civ. Code art. 1948-1965. Article 1948 states: "Consent may be vitiated by
error, fraud, or duress."
4. La. Civ. Code arts. 1959-1964; La. Civ. Code arts. 1850-1859 (1870).
5. See Litvinoff, "Error" in the Civil Law, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations
222 (1. Dainow ed. 1969). See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1949, 1955, and 1959.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 1959.
7. 'Litvinoff, supra note 5.
8. 466 So. 2d 1317 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 29 (La. 1985).
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the contract, the court employed reasoning which has been explicitly
rejected in prior jurisprudence, but which may find support in the theory
underlying the duress provisions and in the language of the Louisiana
Civil Code.
Dunham involved a contract which created a consultant position for
the plaintiff, Ted Dunham, Jr. The contract was entered into on behalf
of the Anderson-Dunham Corporation by long-time employee, J. C.
Jackson. The parties executed the contract at a meeting which Jackson
thought was called for the sole purpose of executing employment con-
tracts between himself and the defendant-company, and between George
Hamilton, another long-time employee, and the company. Dr. Fred
Endsley, majority shareholder, Chairman of the Board, and Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer of Anderson-Dunham called the meeting. 9 To the surprise
of Jackson and Hamilton, Endsley also arranged for the attendance of
plaintiff in order to conclude the consultant services agreement. Two
days prior to this meeting, the board of Anderson-Dunham had adopted
a resolution granting Jackson extensive hiring and firing responsibilities.
Endsley and plaintiff requested that Jackson use this newly-created au-
thority by signing the consultant services contract on behalf of the
company. Jackson initially resisted signing because he did not understand
the need for his signature, since Endsley was available. Further, Jackson
wanted assurance that the company would provide one of his co-workers
with a contract similar to those executed in favor of Hamilton and
himself. After nearly an hour of refusal by Jackson, and insistence by
Endsley and plaintiff, Jackson signed the contract. Ten days later,
Endsley resigned as corporate officer and director of Anderson-Dunham,
and the board immediately repudiated the contract with plaintiff. Plain-
tiff sued to have the contract enforced. 10
The trial court rejected plaintiff's demand and allowed rescission
based on a finding that Jackson had not freely consented. Despite
concluding that Jackson had not incurred any threat to "sign it or
else," the court concluded that "[hie was certainly fearful of his position,
having been there for thirty-three years and also was not wanting to
9. During this time Endsley was also executor and co-trustee of the estate of plaintiff's
father, Ted Dunham, Sr. Despite court instructions to conclude the succession independently
and impartially, Endsley had engaged in business dealings with plaintiff, and approximately
seven weeks prior to this meeting, arranged for plaintiff's membership on the Anderson-
Dunham board. Soon thereafter plaintiff was elected Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer. One week prior to the meeting in question, the court handling the
Dunham succession influenced Endsley to remove plaintiff from all postitions with the
company. It was in the wake of this removal that the consultant services contract was
born. 466 So. at 1319, 1325-26.
10. Id. at 1319-20, 1325-28.
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offend his-his [sic] bosses, Dr. Endsley and Ted Dunham, Jr."" Based
on this inference that Jackson was concerned about his job security,
and on the fact that he was asked to sign a contract about which he
had no previous knowledge, the court concluded that Jackson's "was
not a consent freely given and that it was under duress by those cir-
cumstances."' 2 The court of appeal affirmed and, like the trial court,
found duress in spite of the absence of an ultimatum: "He admitted
that his job was not put on the line, nor was he threatened or coerced
in any other manner; he admitted that he could have left the room at
any time, that no one required him to sign, and that he eventually
signed the contract voluntarily."' 3 Nevertheless, because of the "nature
of the transaction, combined with the background of the various wit-
nesses and their relationships with each other,' ' 4 the court reasoned that
there was sufficient evidence for the lower court to have found "duress
of the circumstances."' 5
The Louisiana Civil Code articles which concern duress provide both
objective and subjective criteria for determining whether there has oc-
cured an impairment of the will sufficient to rescind a contract: the
fear in question must be "reasonable," and the reasonableness is gauged
according to the party's "[a]ge, health, disposition, and other personal
circumstances.' ' 6 Thus, the Dunham courts' consideration of Jackson's
employment history, the fact that the meeting in question was called in
part to settle his employment future, the suddenness with which he was
confronted with the consultant services contract, and the particular in-
dividuals confronting him would have been valid if they had found that
Jackson in fact signed the contract out of fear. However, these inquiries
were unwarranted because the courts readily acknowledged that Jackson
did not appear to suffer "just fear of great injury," 7 and Jackson
admitted that he could have left the meeting unscathed. While Jackson's
reluctance and indecisiveness were clear, these are poor bases upon which
11. Id. at 1328. Plaintiff occupied no position with the company at the time of this
meeting, and while he had held positions higher than Jackson in the past, he was not
at the time of this event Jackson's "boss." See supra note 9.
12. Id. at 1328.
13. Id. at 1322.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 1959 states:
Consent is vitiated when it has been obtained by duress of such a nature as
to cause a reasonable fear of unjust and considerable injury to a party's person,
property, or reputation. Age, health, disposition, and other personal circum-
stances of a party must be taken into account in determining reasonableness of
the fear.
Article 1851 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 was not significantly different.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 1851 (1870).
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to invalidate a contract, in light of the damage inflicted upon the doctrine
of security of transactions when courts rescind contracts. It does not
seem that Anderson-Dunham was deserving of the protection afforded
by the duress provisions of the code. 8
Additionally, in granting recission based upon a finding of duress
by the circumstances, the two courts relied on a concept which was
previously rejected in the Louisiana jurisprudence. Wilson v. Aetna
Casualty Co.'9 contains the most explicit disapproval of the reasoning
used by the courts in Dunham. In Wilson, defendant's insured seriously
injured plaintiff in an automobile accident. Prior to any litigation, and
while plaintiff was still in the hospital recovering from his injuries,
defendant offered plaintiff five thousand dollars to settle his claim.
Plaintiff rejected defendant's offer and made a counter-offer of ten
thousand dollars, which defendant refused. Defendant stated, however,
that the five thousand dollar offer would remain open should plaintiff
wish to accept it. Subsequent to this meeting, plaintiff's doctor told
plaintiff that his condition had improved sufficiently for him to be
discharged from the hospital, and that if plaintiff were not discharged,
he would be billed at an increased rate. Plaintiff's unpaid medical bills
totalled approximately two thousand dollars, his medicare benefits had
been exhausted, and he was in immediate need of nursing care and in
future need of physical therapy. There was no one to provide free care
for plaintiff upon his leaving the hospital, and his income, which prior
to his accident was low, was limited to monthly social security payments,
as his injuries precluded him from working.2 0 While plaintiff apparently
attempted to secure an attorney to assist him in his claim, he did not
retain one. Instead, he relied on his doctor's advice and accepted defend-
ant's offer, believing that his acceptance was the only means to obtain
a prompt settlement.
2
1
18. See New Orleans & N.E.R.R. Co. v. Louisiana Constr. & Improvement Co., 109
La. 13, 33 So. 51 (1902) (the court rejected a claim that payment had been made under
duress because the claimant had "at hand other means of immediate relief" than payment);
Allen v. Volunteers of America, 378 So. 2d 1030 (La App. 2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
381 So. 2d 509 (La. 1980) (the court held that vacillation over a decision to give up a
child for adoption did not prove an impaired consent). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1854
(1870): "The mere reverential fear of a relation in the ascending line, where no violence
has been offered, nor threats made, will not invalidate a contract." Although Jackson
was not dealing with relatives, an analogy may be made under which the head of the
company for which Jackson had worked for over thirty years assumes the same type of
position as the "relation" in the code article, suggesting another basis upon which the
finding of duress may be questioned. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 (1979),
which requires that a party seeking to have a contract voided on the basis of duress have
had "no reasonable alternative" to entering the contract.
19. 228 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
20. Id. at 230-32
21. Id. at 231.
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Plaintiff later sued defendant for his injuries, and defendant raised
the exception of res judicata, based on plaintiff's acceptance of the five
thousand dollar release. The trial court rejected defendant's exception,
finding instead that the compromise required annulment because of the
"intolerable and untenable position in which this plaintiff found himself"
when he executed the release. 22 The court of appeal reversed based on
a conclusion that:
[T]he contract-invalidating duress referred to [in the code] is
that which proceeds from a fear of force or violence which
wipes out freedom of consent; it connotes an actor performing
an exterior act which gives rise to the duress, rather than the
entire set of objective circumstances causing the victim to act
as he does.
23
Plaintiff's lack of bargaining power to resist defendant's offer, and his
poor economic condition, "[did] not constitute a Code-recognized ground
to rescind a compromise. ' 24 Additionally, the doctor's advice was not
a cause for rescission because it was not a threat to plaintiff's person
or property. 2
5
The refusal by the court in Wilson to consider "the entire set of
objective circumstances" as a source of duress indicates that that court
would not have rescinded the contract in Dunham on the same grounds
as the Dunham courts. A Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Bryant v.
Levy, 26 strikes a balance between the Wilson court's emphasis on the
need for an "actor performing an exterior act," and the Dunham courts'
willingness to look to the circumstances surrounding the party's claim.
The fact patterns in the three cases provide a useful framework within
which to evaluate the notion of duress by circumstance.
The dispute in Bryant arose in the wake of agreements within the
cotton industry among laborers and "pressmen" to raise the price of
handling cotton. Prior to these agreements, plaintiffs bound themselves
under a verbal agreement to store and compress cotton belonging to
defendants, who were cotton brokers. When plaintiffs told defendants
that they would only handle defendants' cotton at the raised prices,
defendants, the only local brokers who had refused to agree to the new
pricing schedule, secured another press with which to do business. This
new press agreed to handle defendants' cotton at a lower rate than that
charged by the pressmen operating under the general agreements; for
this reason, however, the laborers who hauled the cotton to the various
22. Id. at 232.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 52 La. Ann. 1649, 28 So. 191 (1900).
1985]
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presses refused to handle defendants' cotton, absent consent by the
plaintiffs as to defendants' use of this new press. Plaintiffs, having
extended defendants an offer (which expired in one more day) to handle
their cotton at the raised prices, refused to so consent.
At the time, the cotton industry was in a precarious financial sit-
uation, and defendants' business was no exception. Further delays in
operations would probably have forced defendants out of the market.
As a result, defendants accepted plaintiffs' offer, but when plaintiffs
later attempted to enforce the agreement, defendants claimed that they
had accepted under coercion. 27 The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in
favor of defendants on the duress claim, concluding:
[Diefendants could not do otherwise than they did, and save
their business; ... Had they refused to sign this contract, the
evidence shows that financial ruin would have been the inevitable
result .... These circumstances were sufficient to wrest from
defendants a consent which they did not wish to give. They
were placed in a position where they must sign or perish fi-
nancially. 21
While this language seems in direct contradiction to the approach taken
by the court in Wilson, the holding in Bryant is not based solely on
these statements. The court also based its rejection of plaintiffs' claim
upon the finding that the pricing agreements constituted illegal restraints
of trade.2 9 Thus, while in both Wilson and Bryant the party alleging
duress suffered from circumstances independent of the particular situ-
ation which motivated the formation of the respective contracts (i.e.,
Wilson suffered from a low income prior to his accident and the defend-
ants in Bryant from the general economic condition of the cotton in-
dustry), the cases may be distinguished in that the defendants in Bryant
suffered in part from the deliberate, unlawful actions of others.
Bryant and Wilson both stand for the proposition that an exterior
act is required for there to be coercion sufficient to constitute the duress
described in the Louisiana Civil Code. Bryant further indicates, in com-
pliance with specific code provisions and the jurisprudence, that the act
in question does not improperly impair the will of the party claiming
duress if that act is the exercise of a lawful right.3 0 Finally, the Bryant
court's emphasis on the fact that defendants entered the contract only
27. Id. at 1653-56, 28 So. at 193-94.
28. Id. at 1657, 1661-62, 28 So. at 194, 196.
29. Id. at 1662-63, 28 So. at 196-97.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 1962; see, e.g., Wright v. Sabine River Auth., 308 So. 2d
402 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Texas Co. v. MacDonald, 228 La. 353, 82 So. 2d 37 (1955);
Storey v. Stanton, 182 La. 876, 162 So. 649 (1935); Patorno v. Vacaro, 153 La. 364, 95
So. 864 (1923).
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because no reasonable alternative was open to them complies with the
theory underlying the vices of consent scheme that the party claiming
the vice must have entered the contract without fault. 31
Dunham, conversely, meets none of these requirements. The courts'
acknowledgment of the fact that Jackson was free to leave the meeting
evinces a disregard for the "no fault" requirement. Furthermore, the
insistence by Endsley and plaintiff that Jackson sign the contract fails
to meet the exterior act requirement, since by Jackson's own testimony
there was nothing coercive in their insistence. Endsley and plaintiff's
actions seem more analogous to the influence of the doctor in Wilson
than to the pricing agreements found unlawful in Bryant.
Nevertheless, while the courts which decided Dunham may be crit-
icized on the grounds that Jackson appears to have freely entered the
contract, their reliance on a duress formula, which is not restricted to
a particular actor exerting some particular force, is defensible. The
"violence or threats" language of the code of 1870, which seems to
have been the basis for the actor-induced theory employed by the Wilson
court, does not necessarily require the limitations imposed by that theory.
The purpose behind the duress provisions and the particular language
of those provisions support a broader interpretation of those influences
which may give rise to a valid claim of duress.
The interest served by rescinding contracts which are entered into
under duress is the protection of the free will of contracting parties. In
light of this end, it is logical to argue that it is the effect-the impaired
consent-rather than the cause-the source of that impairment--which
is most critical in the duress analysis. Planiol supported this proposition
when he wrote that, while "[s]trictly speaking, the word 'duress' denotes
the means of constraint used, and not the effect produced upon the
mind of the victim. . . . [Ilt is, as a matter of fact, far more the fear
felt by the victim of the violence which gave rise to it which constitutes
the vice of consent." 32 One need only look to the Wilson decision to
see how focusing on the cause of the victim's fear, rather than on the
effect, can defeat the purpose behind the duress provisions. Mr. Wilson's
consent to the compromise was clearly impaired; the court of appeal
recognized this when it stated, "the plaintiff Wilson had no bargaining
power to resist the defendant's offer and was instead under strong
economic duress to accept it."" Notwithstanding this finding, the court
enforced the contract.
In addition to the general purpose behind the duress scheme, the
language of the pertinent civil code articles supports an emphasis on
31. See supra notes 15 and 17.
32. I M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, Pt. 1, No. 227 at 193 (12th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. Trans. 1959).
33. 228 So. 2d at 232.
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the effect, rather than the cause, of the alleged nullity. A contract may
be rescinded for duress which is "of such a nature as to cause a
reasonable fear of unjust and considerable injury .... Age, health,
disposition, and other personal circumstances of a party must be taken
into account in determining the reasonableness of the fear." '34 Thus, the
ability of a party to have a contract rescinded depends solely on the
quality of the fear which he experiences, i.e., whether the fear is suf-
ficiently "reasonable." The significance of the source of the fear is
limited to the nature of the effect which it produces. That the code
allows rescission "even when duress is exerted by a third person," 35 is
further testimony to the fact that the source of the fear is of less
consequence than the fear itself. In only one instance does the code
allow the source of a victim's fear to prevail over the inquiry into the
reasonableness of the fear: when there is a threat which involves the
exercise of a legal right.16 This is, however, the exception rather than
the rule.
It follows then that "violence or threats," or "duress, 3 7 may en-
compass a broader scope of pressures incurred by a contracting party
than only those that are "actor-induced." Pressing financial, medical,
or other physical needs may in certain situations be as threatening as
anything an "actor" may inspire. The following hypotheticals illustrate
this point: A parent owns a certain piece of valuable movable property
which he refuses to sell until someone threatens to injure the parent's
child unless the parent sells the object to the individual making the
threat. If the parent subsequently wishes to have the sale annulled,
duress would be an obvious and convincing basis for his claim. If,
however, the child is sick, and the parent must sell the object to acquire
funds to pay for medical treatment to save the child's life, has the
parent entered the sale under any less of a threat, or any less reasonable
a fear? Arguably not, despite that in the second situation the source
of the fear was the child's illness, rather than an actor performing an
unlawful act. Further, in the first instance, alternative means to solving
the predicament may have been available to the parent (e.g., securing
law enforcement assistance), while in the second situation the options
are more limited.
Despite the support which the theory of duress by circumstance may
find in the language of the code and in furthering the protection of
the free contractual will, rescinding contracts for duress in the absence
34. La. Civ. Code art. 1959.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 1961.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 1962.
37. See La. Civ. Code art. 1959 comment b, which states that "duress" is a technical
term which means "violence or threats."
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of threats or violence by a particular actor may produce undesirable
results. A particularly troublesome area involves the party to the contract
who benefits from the duress victim's execution of the agreement. Under
the actor-induced theory of duress, this benefiting party is either re-
sponsible for the duress and thus is not unjustly injured by rescission,
or he has an action against a third party who is responsible for the
victim's fear. However, if circumstances alone impair the consent to the
contract, and the court grants rescission, the innocent benefitting party
has no one to bring an action against for compensation. While he would
perhaps have an action in detrimental reliance against the victim of the
duress,3" he would still be deprived of the benefit of the bargain which
he contracted. Further, the impairment of the victim's free will by
circumstances alone may occur when the benefitting party initiated the
formation of the contract by exercising a lawfully possessed right. This
would have occurred, for instance, if the court in Bryant had found
that while the pricing agreements did not unlawfully restrain trade, the
financial circumstances experienced by the defendants had impaired their
consent in a degree sufficient to warrant rescission.
The important question raised by these issues is how to balance the
social interest in protecting the free will of contracting parties with the
interest in the security of transactions. Since these issues would only
arise when a court has determined that one party's free will was impaired
by circumstances sufficient to vitiate consent, inquiry into whether the
victim of the duress deserves the protection he seeks through rescission
is redundant. Instead, it may be useful to inquire whether the party
not suffering the duress, but who may be injured by rescission, is
deserving of the protection afforded by the doctrine of the security of
transactions.
The doctrine of good faith provides a mechanism to evaluate the
situation of the benefiting party. Revised article 1759 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, which states, "Good faith shall govern the conduct of the
obligor and obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation," is broad
enough to apply to the formation as well as the performance of a
contract. The benefiting party who breaches this duty of good faith
when negotiating a contract with a party under the duress of certain
circumstances may be less deserving of the protection afforded by the
doctrine of the security of transactions.
The facts in Wilson, Dunham, and Bryant illustrate how the doctrine
of good faith may be employed in this context. The court in Wilson,
having found that the plaintiff had not entered the contract freely, might
38. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 1952: "A party who obtains rescission on grounds of his
own error is liable for the loss thereby sustained by the other party unless the latter knew
or should have known of the error ......
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have inquired into defendant's conduct in the negotiation of the trans-
action. The court might have ascertained the extent of the defendant's
knowledge of plaintiff's financial and medical needs and whether, in
light of such knowledge, there was a settlement offer that the company
could have proposed that would have been so low as to violate the
principle of good faith.3 9 The age of the plaintiff and the nature of his
physical injuries might well be important factors in such a determination.
Also, defendant's conduct might be considered in a different light if it
had been plaintiff who initiated settlement discussions. In Dunham, if
there were in fact circumstances to support a finding that Jackson had
signed the contract with a "just fear of great injury," conduct by
Endsley and plaintiff relevant to a good faith inquiry might have been:
insinuations as to Jackson's future with the company; 40 making certain
terms of Jackson's employment contract depend on his signing the
consultant services contract; and making the execution of the employment
contracts for his two colleagues depend on the same. In Bryant, the
court could have found that the pricing agreements did not unlawfully
restrain trade, but that the financial circumstances existing when defend-
ants entered the contract were alone enough to support a finding of
duress. Presuming such a finding, prior to deciding which party was
more deserving of protection, the court could have considered plaintiffs'
refusal to consent to defendants' use of another press and the length
of time which plaintiffs allowed their offer to defendants to stand.
Another device by which to evaluate whether the benefiting party
should be entitled to protection against rescission is the "abuse of rights"
theory. 4' This theory normally provides relief to a party injured by
another's exercise of a right when that right is exercised without a
serious or legitimate interest, or is inspired only by the desire to harm
the injured party.42 It could logically be applied in cases of duress by
circumstance to deprive the benefiting party of the protection that the
security of transactions might provide him when he has abused a right
in conjunction with the formation or performance of a contract. For
example, if under the facts of Wilson, upon plaintiff's initial rejection
39. In the trial court, plaintiff's damages were calculated as being in excess of $16,000;
defendant's settlement offer was $5,000.
40. See Standard Coffee Serv. Co. v. Babin, 472 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1985) (the court invalidated an employment contract based on a finding that the defendant
had been under duress when his employer required him to sign the contract or lose his
job; while the good faith inquiry under this suggested analysis is distinct from the duress
inquiry, this case suggests that any such insinuations by Endsley would have been in
violation of good faith).
41. For a detailed discussion of this theory, see Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 La.
L. Rev. 965 (1975).
42. Id. at 991-92.
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of defendant's five thousand dollar offer to settle, defendant had told
plaintiff that it intended to extend the litigation as long as possible by
procedural means available to it, thus denying plaintiff access to dam-
ages, the court might justifiably have overlooked contentions by defend-
ant that rescission for duress by circumstance would deprive defendant
of both the benefit of the contract and any actionable relief. This theory
does not conflict with the civil code provision that "a threat of doing
a lawful act or a threat of exercising a right does not constitute duress, 43
for two reasons. First, in the hypothetical, a finding of duress may be
supported by the circumstances affecting plaintiff independent of any
action by defendant; second, the abuse of right theory stands for the
proposition that abusive exercises of lawfully possessed rights are un-
lawful. As this illustration indicates, the questions invoked by employing
the abuse of rights analysis would be similar to those raised by the
doctrine of good faith.
Conclusion
While the facts in Dunham provide a weak foundation upon which
to rest the theory of duress by circumstance, for the simple reason that
the circumstances therein did not seem to inspire any fear within Jackson,
the theory itself is not without merit. Duress by circumstance may find
support in the purpose of the duress institution and in the language of
the code articles. Nevertheless, the party asserting duress by circumstance
may have to satisfy requirements beyond those necessary to succeed in
an actor-induced claim. Not only must the victim prove that the duress
was of a sufficient degree to justify rescission, it is also likely that he
will have to prove some equitable basis upon which to deny the benefiting
party the protection of the doctrine of the security of transactions.
Jonathan A. Hunter
43. La. Civ. Code art. 1962.
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